We analyze the performance of an incentive scheme for two-hop Delay-Tolerant Networks (DTNs) in which a backlogged source proposes a fixed reward to the relays to deliver a message. Only one message at a time is proposed by the source. For a given message, only the first relay to deliver it gets the reward corresponding to this message thereby inducing a competition between the relays. The relays seek to maximize the expected reward for each message, whereas the objective of the source is to satisfy a given constraint on the probability of message delivery. We show that the optimal policy of a relay is of threshold type: it accepts a message until a first threshold and then keeps the message until it either meets the destination or reaches the second threshold. Formulas for computing the thresholds as well as probability of message delivery are derived for a backlogged source.
12:2 T. T. H. Nguyen et al.
Due to random node mobility and uncertainty in connectivity, DTN routing schemes usually replicate many copies of the message. In particular, Epidemic routing is flooding-based in nature, as relays continuously replicate and transmit messages to newly discovered contacts that do not already possess a copy of the message [29] . The advantage is that it can be guaranteed with high probability that some copy will reach the destination, and with a minimum delivery delay; but the downside is that it floods the network with message copies, leading to a significant energy consumption. Other routing schemes have been proposed as well (see Chapter 2 of the Ph.D. thesis in Ref. [9] for a detailed description of the different schemes). For instance, in the two-hop routing scheme, which is known to provide a good tradeoff between message delivery time and energy consumption [1] , a relay cannot forward the message to another relay, so it stores and carries the message until the relay is in radio range of the destination.
The delivery of a message incurs various costs for a relay, in particular in terms of energy-a scarce resource in mobile networks. It can therefore be expected that even though some nodes will cooperate out of altruism, many mobile nodes will behave selfishly, acting as "free riders" that profit from the resources of others for transmitting their own messages without offering their own resources in exchange. Clearly, if there are too many selfish mobile nodes, the network collapses and it is no longer possible to communicate between nodes. It is therefore crucial to design incentive mechanisms to persuade mobile nodes to serve as relays.
Contributions:
In the present work, we analyze the incentive mechanism for message delivery in two-hop DTNs assuming a backlogged source (a source with infinite number of messages to send) and a fixed reward (may depend upon the message). When the source wants to send a message, it proposes a fixed reward to each relay it meets. The reward may vary from message to message, but for a given message, the same reward is proposed to each relay. The first relay to deliver gets the reward. The relay can decide to accept or to reject the message depending on the time at which it meets the source. The cost of delivering the message for a relay consists of a linear term that depends upon the duration the relay carries this message as well as constant terms for receiving and transmitting the message.
One of the main questions in incentive mechanisms is to determine the value of reward that an agent should propose. The main aim of this article is to give the precise relationship between the performance measures and the reward when multiple relays are competing for message delivery. This, in turn, will help the source provide an adequate reward in order to achieve a target delivery probability. Toward this end:
-We model the strategic message delivery game described above as a Bayesian game. The meeting time of a relay with the source is known to this relay only and can be seen as the private information of this relay. The other relays have a belief distribution on this time but do not know its exact value. Such games with asymmetric information and beliefs on the unknown information are modeled by Bayesian games. -For the Bayesian game described above, we show that any pure Bayesian Nash equilibria (pure BNE) policy of a relay is of a threshold type: a relay accepts a message until the first threshold and then keeps it until it either meets the destination or reaches the second threshold. Once a message is no longer accepted by the relays, the source starts giving out the next message. The thresholds of a message depend upon its index and the reward proposed. -A pure BNE may not be unique. It could be symmetric, that is, each relay has the same two thresholds (depends upon the message) for a given message, or asymmetric. We give examples of scenarios with multiple pure BNEs. However, we shall show that any symmetric NE is unique. -For pure symmetric BNE, for each message, formulas for the thresholds as well as for performance measures such as the probability of delivery and expected delay are derived as a function of the reward proposed for this message. This analysis will be called transient analysis, that is, for message k, the quantities will depend upon k. Figure 1 illustrates how, at the symmetric BNE, messages will be injected by the source into the network. At time θ 0 , the source will start proposing message 1, which the relays will accept if they meet the source after θ 0 and before θ 1 . At θ 1 , the source will stop proposing message 1 because it knows that none of the relays will accept it, and start proposing message 2. A relay that accepted message 1 will keep it until γ 1 or until it meets the destination, whichever occurs earlier, after which it will drop this message.
Related work:
There has been a large body of literature on incentive mechanisms for DTNs. These mechanisms can be broadly classified into three categories: reputation-based schemes [17, 31] , barter-based schemes [4] , and credit-based schemes [8, 23, 32, 35] .
Reputation-based schemes, such as a secure and objective reputation-based incentive (SORI) [13] , MobiGame [30] , Confidant [3] , and In-network realization of incentives to combat selfishness (RELICS) [28] are based on a simple principle: a node's message is forwarded only if it has forwarded messages originated from others. This, however, requires each node to monitor the traffic information of all encountered nodes and keep track of their reputation values. In addition, these reputation values should be updated and propagated to all other nodes efficiently and effectively, which is clearly impractical due to the intermittent connectivity between nodes.
Barter-based incentive mechanisms have also been considered to enforce fair cooperation of all nodes. For example, the authors of Ref. [27] propose an incentive-aware routing protocol that is based on the Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy, in which each node forwards as much traffic for an encountered node as the latter forwards for it. In Refs. [4] and [5] , Buttyan et al. propose a mechanism that is based on the principle of barter: a node relays the message of a neighbor if the latter relays a message of the former in return. One of the issues with this scheme is that a message might be not delivered to its destination if the destination has no message to forward in return.
Finally, in credit-based schemes, the credits earned by nodes from forwarding the messages of other nodes can be used to pay for the delivery of their own ones. As compared to reputation-based schemes, these schemes do not require global information sharing, but they assume the existence of a Trusted Third Party to manage the rewarding procedure. Credit-based incentive schemes are often designed using concepts from Game Theory, such as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions [15, 33] or Minority Games [7] . Other examples of credit-based schemes are Mobicent [8] , a secure multilayer credit-based incentive (SMART) [35] , practical incentive system (PIS) [16] , Inpac [10] and faire reimbursement and motivating sweepstake (FRAME) [14] , among others.
For most of these schemes, it has been difficult to obtain performance measures such as probability of message delivery and mean time to deliver a message with the exception of Refs. [2] and [23] .
In Ref. [2] , a simple reward-based mechanism was proposed in which the first relay to deliver gets the reward. The author provided the expression for the successful delivery probability of a packet within a fixed time τ with the assumption that a relay i will participate in delivering the packet until a certain time. It was shown that the equilibrium policy is of a threshold type: relays participate until a certain time after which they are deactivated. All the computations and results are for a single message. Our setting is different from Ref. [2] in the following ways. In that work, the relays decided how long they participate in the network, and during this time, they accepted the message with certain probability and did not drop it. In our work, the relays can decide how long they accept the message and then how long they keep it. This gives more freedom to the relays to make their choice. Our cost structure is also different from that in Ref. [2] . The linear term in our work depends only upon the duration the relay stores a message whereas in Ref. [2] , this term depends upon the time the relay is participating. These two are different because in the latter case, relays accrue a cost even if they do not have a message. Furthermore, there is no cost of receiving the message from the source in Ref. [2] . The inclusion of this cost leads to a policy with two thresholds in our case as opposed to a single threshold in Ref. [2] . We also show how the performance measures depend upon the reward offered by the source, thereby giving the source an explicit way to compute the reward so as to achieve its targeted performance. Finally, we consider a backlogged source as opposed to a single message in Ref. [2] . This induces dependence between the policies of messages that were not there in that work.
In Ref. [23] , the source offers rewards that depend upon the meeting time with the condition that only the first one to deliver the message receives its reward. Since the mobility model is random, a relay that meets the source later has lower probability of being the first to deliver the message and, hence, receive the reward. The reward proposed to a relay is inversely proportional to its success probability, and it is such that a relay always accepts the message. The analysis relies heavily on the assumption that the relays do not discard a message once they accept it from the source. This assumption may be realistic in participative networks in which nodes are altruistic. On the other hand, when nodes are selfish, as is the case in the present article, they could decide to throw away a message once it is no longer profitable to keep it (because the probability of success is too small) and reduce their costs. This possibility to reject or drop the messages is the main difference of our work with Ref. [23] , in which no strategic interaction between relays was considered.
A model similar to the one studied in this work was first considered in Ref. [24] (which is based on Chapter 5 of Ref. [22] ) in which the competition was modeled as a stochastic game. That model was in discrete time, restricted to two relays and a single message, and had partial results on the optimal policy. The model studied in the present work is in continuous time, for an arbitrary number of relays, and a backlogged (with possibly infinite number of messages) source that sequentially proposes messages. The passage from a discrete-time to a continuous-time model introduces some technical difficulties such as decisions that can be made at arbitrary time instants instead of just at Poisson ones. Thus, our problem cannot be modeled directly as a continuous-time Markov Decision Process (MDP), which would be the natural analog of the discrete-time MDP in Ref. [24] . To circumvent this problem, we use the framework of Bayesian games, which imposes certain restrictions on the actions but at the same time removes the constraint on decisions at Poisson instants. In the accompanying report [20] , we give, nonetheless, a continuous-time MDP formulation and a uniformization-based informal argument that shows that same results can also be expected using this alternative method. Preliminary results of this work without the Bayesian game formulation but with the informal MDP one have appeared in Ref. [19] . The results in that paper were limited to a game with just one message for the source. Here, we generalize the results to a backlogged source. Also, we give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium, which were not given in that article.
Organization:
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to model description. In Section 3, the Bayesian game is formally defined and the structure of the best-response policy of a relay is shown to be of threshold type. Section 4 gives the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the symmetric BNE. In Section 5, we present a method for recursively computing the thresholds of the symmetric equilibrium as well as the probabilities of message delivery for a backlogged source. In Section 6, we assess the applicability of our results against a real-world scenario using GPS-based mobility traces. Some conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
MODEL DESCRIPTION
Consider a network of one source, one destination, and N relays. The source and the destination are assumed to be fixed, whereas the relays move according to a given mobility model. It is assumed that the mobility pattern of any two relays are independent, and that the inter-contact times between relay i and the source (resp. the destination) are independent and identically distributed according to an exponential distribution of rate λ i (resp. μ i ). The inter-contact processes of different relays with the source as well as with the destination are assumed to be statistically identical. We note that the assumption of exponentially distributed inter-contact times is satisfied under the Random Waypoint Mobility model [6, 12, 25, 26] and has been observed to hold in real motion traces [34] .
When it meets the source, a relay is offered a fixed reward, R k , to deliver message k. The reward is fixed in the sense that, for a given message, each relay is offered the same reward irrespective of their meeting times. The relay has a choice to either accept the message or not. There is no cost associated with rejecting the message. If it accepts the message, the relay can decide to drop the message at any time in the future at no additional cost. If during this time the relay meets the destination, then it can transmit the message to the destination and claim the reward only if it is the first one to do so for this message.
The various costs incurred for accepting and storing a message are assumed to be as follows: (i) C r is the cost of receiving the message from the source; (ii) C d is the cost of transmitting the message to the destination; and (iii) C s is the cost per unit time for storing the message. These costs are all the same for all relays.
We illustrate the cost structure with an example. Suppose that relay i meets the source at time instant a, accepts the message k, and decides to keep it until time b. Then the expected total cost of keeping the message in the interval (a, b) will be
where
is the probability that the relay is the first one to deliver this message when it meets the destination at time τ . A one-time cost of C r is incurred for accepting the message at a. From then on, a storage cost of C s is incurred per unit of time either until b (that is, for a duration b − a) or until it meets the destination. If the relay meets the destination at time t < b, and it is the first one to meet the destination with this message, then it will transmit the message to the destination and get the reward, thereby incurring a net cost of
. So, the second term is the expected cost incurred if the relay meets the destination before b. Finally, the last term is the storage cost incurred if the relay does not meet the destination before b. The sum of the last two terms will be denoted by G k (a, b), which is the expected cost of keeping the message in the interval (a, b). Note that this cost depends on the strategies of the other relays through the success
The analysis in the article will be done for R k = R, ∀k. This is done to make the notation less cumbersome. The results carry over to the case when the reward depends upon the index of the message. We shall sometimes use the notation R = R − C d . In addition, we shall assume that R ≥ R min := max(R i min ), where
Note that R i min is the average cost of relay i if it were to be the only one to be competing for the message. It is therefore natural that the reward should be larger than this average cost for any relay to participate in forwarding. Then, R min is the minimum required cost in order to have all relays participate in the game.
It shall be assumed that a relay can store only one message at a time. Further, if a relay already has a message in its buffer, then it does not seek a new (or the same) message until it either meets the destination or drops the message. A message can be dropped only because it is no longer profitable to store this message due to a small probability of success but not because the relay meets the source. Once it has delivered or dropped the message, the relay can seek a new one from the source.
The source has an unlimited number of messages to send to the destination, each of which it proposes sequentially. That is, to each message the source associates an interval of time during which it proposes this message to any relay it meets. We shall denote this interval for message k by [θ k−1 , θ k ), where θ k−1 is the last time message k − 1 was proposed.
For a given relay (called tagged relay), when it meets the source, we shall assume that the decision to accept and the duration can depend upon its history of contacts and previous decisions but not upon the history of the other relays. While the exact history of the other relays is not available to the tagged relay, we shall assume that it can compute a belief (or a probability distribution) on when the other relays will meet the source for this message. This belief will be computed based upon the statistics of the mobility model, and will be denoted byΦ i k (t ). An auxiliary quantity is the probability that relay i will enter into competition for message k on or before time t, which will be denoted by Φ i k (t ). By entering into competition on or before time t, we mean that there was time instant before t at which relay i did not have any message with index smaller than k. We shall denote by ϕ i k (t ) the probability density function corresponding to
and an exponential distribution of rate λ i . Let us take an example to illustrate the notion of competing for a message. Suppose there are two relays. Relay 1 meets the source for the first time at some instant between θ 1 and θ 2 when the source is proposing message 2. If relay 2 had the message 1 at time θ 1 , then we say that it is not in competition for message 2 until it has this message, because even if it meets the source, it cannot accept message 2. Now suppose that relay 2 meets the destination at some time t 2 ∈ [θ 1 , θ 2 ). At t 2 , we say that relay 2 enters into competition with relay 1 for message 2. Of course, relay 1 does not have exact knowledge of the contact history of relay 2, but, using the statistics of the mobility model, it can compute the probability that relay 2 entered into competition at time t ∈ [θ 1 , θ 2 ). This probability distribution will be denoted by Φ 2 2 (t ). A further assumption we shall make is that the relays do not know whether there will be any more messages in the future. 1 Hence, they treat each message as though it were the last one. The policy for a message, thus, does not depend upon the future messages but could depend upon the policy for the previous messages.
A BAYESIAN GAME APPROACH
In this section, we shall model the strategic game between the relays as a Bayesian game [11] . These games specifically treat models in which each player has some private information (also called its type) and a belief over the private information of the other players. In our game, each relay knows the time instant it meets the source but does not know the meeting times of the other relays with the source. It however has a belief on the meeting times of the other relays that is captured by the belief functionΦ i k for message k and relay i. This asymmetry in information between relays means that Bayesian games are an appropriate model for finding the equilibrium strategies of the relays.
A Bayesian game is defined by the type space, the strategy space, the common belief, and the utility function for the relays. For message k, the set of types of relay i, T i , is its meeting time with the source relative to the generation instant of this message. 2 Thus, T i = [0, ∞). The strategy, S i , is assumed to be [0, ∞), where the strategy s = 0 implies that the message is refused whereas s > 0 implies the message is accepted and kept until time s or until it meets the destination (whichever occurs first). We shall assume that the type of player i is a random variable with distributionΦ i and is independent of the types of the other relays. This defines the joint belief structure for the types of the relays.
Remark. The structure of the Bayesian game is such that the dependence on message k is only through the belief distributions Φ i k . In the following, we shall present a solution of the game by assuming an arbitrary belief structure. Later on, we shall explain how to compute the belief for message k recursively, and then compute the solution for this message using its belief. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, we shall drop the dependence on k.
We now define the remaining quantity, which is the utility function of the relay i, u i . It is a mapping from i S i × T i → R; that is, for every possible action and type of the relays, it defines the reward (or the cost) of relay i. Let ρ i (τ ; s i , s −i , t i , t −i ) be the probability of relay i winning the reward when it meets the destination at τ given s i (resp. t i ), the strategy (resp. type) of relay i, and s −i (resp. (t −i )), the strategy (resp. type) of the other relays. Then, the utility of relay i can be defined by:
is the cost of accepting and keeping the message for duration
With this, we have all the inputs (types, strategies, beliefs, and utilities) necessary to define the Bayesian game and compute its equilibrium. We note that our game is one with a continuum of types and of actions.
Pure Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
A strategy profile for relay i is the function π i : T i → S i that determines the strategy for each possible type of player i. Let π i be a strategy profile for relay i. Then, the strategy profile vector (π * i , π * −i ) is a pure strategy BNE if [18] 
for all i. From the definition of u i and F i , and noting that
3) can be rewritten as:
The existence of an equilibrium for games with a continuum of types and actions is not known in general. In Ref. [18] , sufficient conditions requiring the continuity of the utility functions are presented. These conditions are not satisfied in our setting because of a discontinuity at s = 0, which arises due to the fixed cost, C r of accepting a message. Nonetheless, we are able to obtain the existence of an equilibrium using some properties of the utility functions.
First, we give the structure of the best-response policy of a given relay and for a fixed strategy of the other relays. The structure of the best-response policy will then determine the structure of the pure BNE. 
where, by convention, the supremum of the empty set is 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 3.1 says that for a fixed policy of the other relays, there exists a θ i such that if the type of relay i is less than θ i (i.e., if it meets the source before θ i ), then its optimal strategy will be to accept the message and keep it until γ i > t (unless it meets the destination first). If it meets the source after θ i , then its optimal strategy will be to refuse the message.
Note that in Theorem 3.1, nothing precludes that γ i = ∞, or even that θ i = γ i = ∞, as shown in the following example. Consider the case where the strategy of the other relays is to never accept the message. In that case, the success probability of relay i is p i (x ) = 1 for all x ≥ 0, and it follows from the assumption R ≥ R i min that γ i = ∞. Moreover, since in that case
− R < 0 for all t ≥ 0, we also have θ i = ∞. Hence, the best-response policy of player i is to always accept the message and to keep it forever. This shows in particular that under the assumption R ≥ R i min , the vector of policies in which all relays always reject the message cannot be an equilibrium of our game.
A direct consequence of Theorem 3.1 is the following structural result of any pure BNE.
Corolary 3.1. At a pure BNE, if any, all players use a threshold-type policy; that is, there exist vectors θ and γ such that relay i uses a threshold-type strategy with parameters (θ i , γ i ).
A pure BNE can be asymmetric or symmetric. An asymmetric equilibrium can be of the form: relay 1 always accepts and keeps the message until it meets the destination and relay 2 never accepts. For an example of this type of asymmetric equilibrium, assume that λ i = μ i = 1 for all i. Under the given policy of relay 1, the probability of success of relay 2 at time t will be
From Equations (6) and (8), it follows that γ 2 will be finite. Suppose that relay 2 meets the source at time 0. This is the most favorable scenario for relay 2. If it is not profitable to accept the message at time 0, then it will never be so later on. From Equation (1), if the relay meets the source at time 0, then its total cost to go if it accepts the message and keeps it until time γ 2 will be
That is, ifR < 4 3 C r , then relay 2 will always have a positive cost of accepting and its best response will be never to accept. Of course, ifR > C r + C s , then relay 1 will always accept if it knows that relay 2 will never accept because this reward is greater than the average cost incurred by one relay. Thus, we have the claimed asymmetric equilibrium.
In the sequel, we let λ i = λ, and μ i = μ for all i. We shall study the existence and uniqueness of only the symmetric BNE, that is, equilibria in which all relays use the same thresholds θ k and γ k for message k. Using the fact that best-response policies are of a threshold type, we obtain an explicit expression of the success probability p i k (t ). Assuming that up to message k − 1, only symmetric equilibria have been played, we use this simple expression of the success probability in the following to establish the conditions under which there exists a unique symmetric BNE.
SYMMETRIC BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Assume that all relays have played symmetric equilibria 3 for messages 1, 2, . . . , k − 1, that is, θ i j = θ j and γ i j = γ j for j = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. A direct consequence of Corollary 3.1 is that if all relays play their equilibrium strategies, the success probability p k (t ) of a player has a very simple structure. For y ≥ x ≥ 0, let
for s < x, and v x,y (s) = 1, otherwise. Note that if x = min(θ k , t ) and y = min(γ k , t ), v x,y (s) represents the probability that relay j is not able to deliver the message k by time t given that it comes into play at time s. Then, introducing
the quantity
represents the probability that a relay fails to deliver the message to the destination by time t, either because it does not meet the source by time min(θ k , t ), or because it meets it but does not meet the destination before min(γ k , t ). It then follows that the probability of success of a given relay is
3 In the sequel, since we are treating the symmetric case, we shall not use superscripts to distinguish relays or players. For example, we shall use p k (t ) instead of p i k (t ) for the probability of success.
Note that p k (t ) is constant after γ k , and that
the second threshold γ k is the greatest value of t such that V k (θ k , t ) ≥ ω. For a given θ ≥ 0, let
Note that the function γ (θ ) takes its values in [0, ∞]. We establish in Lemma 4.1 that there exist θ min and θ max such that γ (θ ) = ∞ for θ ≤ θ min , whereas γ (θ ) takes a uniquely defined finite value for θ ∈ (θ min , θ max ].
Lemma 4.1. Let θ min be the solution of
and θ max be such that
Then, for θ fixed, the equation
Proof. See the accompanying report [20] .
We use Lemma 4.1 to establish in Theorem 4.1 below the conditions under which there exists a unique symmetric BNE. 
Under this condition, the symmetric BNE is unique. Moreover, the parameters of the equilibrium are finite, i.e., θ k > 0 and θ k ≤ γ k < ∞ if and only if
and σ = (μ − λ)/λ.
We remind the reader that R min = C r + C s μ + C d is the minimum value that the reward R should have for a single relay to attempt the delivery of a message. Theorem 4.1 shows that for any value of R greater than this minimum value, the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium is guaranteed. Figure 2 illustrates the Condition (19) for the first message when N = 3, μ = 0.4, C s = 0.5, and C r = 4.0. In that case, the minimum value ofR is C r + C s μ = 5.25. We note that for the first message we have e −λθ min = ω and thus b = σ −1 (1 − ω σ ). 
TRANSIENT ANALYSIS OF THE SYMMETRIC BNE
In the rest of the article, we shall focus only on the symmetric equilibrium. First, we give an algorithm to compute the thresholds θ k and γ k for message k, which will then be used to derive the probability of message delivery and expected message delay from these thresholds.
Recursive Computation of the Success Probability
The thresholds θ k and γ k of a symmetric equilibrium are obtained from Refs. (6) and (7), in which
and all relays i. The computation of the function V k (x, y), however, requires the knowledge of the probability density function ϕ k (t ), b a ϕ k (t )dt representing the probability that a given relay comes into play for the delivery of the k th message between time instants a and b. In this section, we shall show how this probability density function can be recursively computed for symmetric equilibria.
To this end, let us define I k (x, t ) as the probability that a relay that comes into play at time x will accept the k th message and will not be able to deliver it to the destination by time t ∈ [θ k , γ k ]. Therefore,
Thus, 1 − I k (x, t ) is the probability that a relay will not have the k th message at time t, either because it has not met the source, or because it has already delivered the message. Similarly, I k (x, t 1 ) − I k (x, t 2 ) represents the probability that a relay that comes into play at time x will meet the source before θ k and deliver the message to the destination in the time interval (t 1 , t 2 ]. Finally, note also that
We use the definition of I k (x, t ) as well as its above-mentioned properties to prove Lemma 5.1 below, which gives a recursion to numerically compute the density ϕ k (t ). where
Lemma 5.1 can be used for the recursive numerical computation of the density ϕ k (t ), from which we can derive the probability of success Figure 3(a) and (b) show the CDF Φ k (t ) and the success probability p k (t ) for k ∈ {1, 2, 10}, respectively, in the case N = 3 relays, using the following parameters: λ = 1.25, μ = 0.4, C s = 0.5, C d = C r = 4.0, and R = 30.
The thresholds θ k and γ k can then be obtained by solving Equations (6) and (7) using any root finding method, such as the bisection method, as illustrated in Algorithm 1.
Performance Metrics
From the point of view of the source, the main performance metrics are the probability that a message is successfully delivered and, provided that it reaches its destination, the expected time to deliver it. Our first result in this direction is on the probability of message delivery. Proposition 5.1. Assume that all relays play a symmetric equilibrium strategy with parameters θ k and γ k for the delivery of message k. Let ζ k be the probability that this message is successfully delivered, that is, the probability that at least one copy reaches the destination by time γ k . Then,
if γ k < ∞, whereas
otherwise.
Proof. From Equation (12), the probability that all relays fail to deliver the message to the destination by time
Compute θ min and θ max as the solutions of Equations (16) and (17) 3:
repeat 5 :
Compute γ (c) as the solution of V k (c, γ ) = ω 8:
γ (c) = ∞ 10:
end if 11 :
if G k < −C r then 13: a = c 14:
end if 17 :
18:
Compute ϕ k+1 (t ) with Equation (22) 20: end for follows from Equations (13) and (6) 
, from which we readily obtain Equation (23) . If, on the contrary, γ k = ∞, then Equation (24) follows from Equation (11) and
We emphasize that Proposition 5.1 can be used by the source to compute the minimum reward R, allowing to achieve a target delivery probability. If, in addition, the source wishes the message to be delivered within a certain amount of time, it can use Proposition 5.2 below. Proposition 5.2. Assume that all relays play a symmetric equilibrium strategy with parameters θ k and γ k for the delivery of message k, and let D k be the expected delivery time of this message. Provided that at least one copy reaches the destination by time γ k , the expected delivery time is
Proof. From Equation (12), we have
and the result directly follows from
We do some simulations with different values of R to see how the expected delay and the probability of success change with R. We take the following values for the parameters: as a function of R ∈ [3 × R min , 8 × R min ] and k (messages 15 and 29 have almost the same expected delay). This figure also shows that for k large, the messages have a greater expected delay than the first messages, whereas Figure 4(a) shows that the probability of success increases with R and approaches 1 as R → ∞. We do another simulation with C r = 2, Figure 5(a) compares the values of the probability of success obtained with Proposition 5.1 against the values obtained through simulations, for R = 10, which yields γ = ∞, and for R = 15.33, which gives a finite γ . Note from Equation (23) that for R = 5.4 × R min , the success probability is the same for all messages, whereas for R = 3 × R min , it decreases with k. Figure 5(b) shows more clearly the convergence of the expected delay with k in the case R = 3 × R min and R = 5.4 × R min .
VALIDATION AGAINST REAL MOBILITY TRACES
To assess the applicability of our results against a real-world scenario in which mobile nodes are not perfectly homogeneous and inter-contact times are not necessarily exponentially distributed, we have used GPS-based mobility traces collected by the cabspotting project 4 in May 2008 in the San Francisco Bay Area in California [21] . In this 30-day experiment, 536 taxi cabs were We first chose a source node and a destination node in San Francisco. Out of the 218 taxi cabs that are frequently enough in radio range of the source and destination nodes, we identified four taxi cabs that have more or less similar mean inter-contact times with the source, as well as with the destination. It was assumed that the transmission range of a taxi is 250m. More details on the positions of the source and destination as well as the locations visited by the cabs are available in the accompanying research report [20] .
The total number of contacts of one of the selected taxi cabs with the source (resp. destination) node is 93 ± 3 (resp. 143 ± 4). In Figure 6 , we show the probability distribution of inter-contact times of taxis 47 and 217 with the destination. It can be seen that these probability distributions are slightly different from each other and that they do not correspond to an exponential distribution. The inter-contact times with the source are closer to an exponential distribution (see Ref. [20] for their distribution). The mean inter-contact times between the source or the destination and the taxis are shown in Table 1 .
The aggregate mean inter-contact time with the source (resp. destination) is 353.5 minutes (resp. 235.3 minutes), whereas its second moment is 260,657 (resp. 151,995). Since inter-contact times with the source (resp. destination) are not exponentially distributed, we choose The simulations then consist of generating meeting times of taxi cabs with the source and the destination. Then, each relay decides whether or not to accept the message and when to drop it depending on the time at which it meets the source and the destination. Then it determines which relay wins the reward. Note that since there were not enough contact times with the source and the destination, inter-contact times were randomly drawn from the empirical distributions obtained from the mobility traces. The value of the delivery ratio ζ k and of the expected delivery time D k were then averaged over 100,000 sample paths. The simulation was performed twice for each value of R: first using the empirical distributions derived from the dataset, and second using exponential inter-contact distributions with parameters λ and μ.
The results obtained for the delivery probabilities of the first 12 messages are shown in Figure 7(a) . For R = 12 × R min , simulation results are in perfect agreement with theoretical values. For R = 2 × R min , we notice that the discrepancy is larger, even though it is always lower than 4.3%. Figure 7(b) shows the results obtained for the expected delivery time. Again, the results obtained for R = 12 × R min are far more accurate than those obtained for R = 2 × R min . However, the maximum error on the expected delivery time is below 5.4%, which might be deemed reasonable, given that the contact processes of the relays with the source and the destination are heterogeneous and do not follow an exponential distribution.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We considered a fixed reward incentive mechanism for a two-hop DTN with a single-destination pair and an arbitrary number of competing relays. The source was assumed to be backlogged and proposes messages in a sequential way to the relays it meets. It was shown that the equilibrium policy of the relays for each message is threshold type. That is, a relay accepts the kth message if and only if it meets the source before a given threshold, and once it accepts the message, it keeps this message until a second threshold. A recursive formula for the computation of these thresholds was presented for symmetric equilibria.
Our results were obtained under a number of crucial assumptions. One of our key assumptions is that of exponentially distributed inter-contact times. Although satisfied under the Random Waypoint Mobility model, this assumption is not always met in practice and it would be natural to relax it. Although the Bayesian game approach is in principle not limited to exponential intercontact time distributions, the analysis becomes much more complex otherwise, in particular for a backlogged source. This avenue is currently being explored.
Another important assumption for some of our results is that the relays have homogeneous contact processes with the source and with the destination. In practice, it often happens that nodes are more or less heterogeneous, with diverse behaviors per each group of nodes. While it was proven that even in a heterogeneous setting, all relays use a threshold strategy at a BNE, it can be expected that, in this case, all equilibria will be asymmetric. As discussed in Section 3, the characterization of asymmetric equilibria is much more involved than that of symmetric ones.
With memory space becoming cheap for modern devices, another natural generalization would be to assume that a relay can store more than one message. This extension, however, gives rise to non-trivial questions. In particular, it is not clear which message a relay should transmit when it meets the destination, assuming that it can give only one. It is not necessarily optimal to transmit the most recent message. Also, the analysis of the probability of success for a relay would be more complicated since it has to take into account which messages other relays transmit when they meet with the destination.
Another possible direction is to introduce a message arrival process at the source; for example, the messages could arrive according to a Poisson process.
One of the assumptions required the relays to know the parameters of the game such as intercontact distributions and the number of players; that is, these quantities are common knowledge. In practice, it is possible that these quantities are unknown, and it may be useful to design learning algorithms that converge to the desired equilibrium.
Extending the above models to multiple sources and destinations as well as allowing the possibility for the relays to drop a message and pick another one are also part of our future plans. д i (t, x )dx. That is, д i (t, x ) is the marginal cost of keeping the message at time x given that it was accepted at time t. The crucial observation is that the sign of д i (t, s) depends only on s:
We use this observation in Lemma A.1 below.
Lemma A.1. Define β (t ) = inf s ≥t G i (t, s) for all t ≥ 0, and let γ i be defined as in Theorem 3.1. Then: (a) β (t ) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ γ i and β (t ) < 0 for all t < γ i ; (b) β (t ) = G i (t, γ i ) for all t < γ i ; and (c) β (t ) is strictly increasing in t in the interval [0, γ i ].
Proof. We first prove assertion (a). By definition of γ i , p i (y) ≤ With Inequality (26), it implies that д i (t, y) < 0 for all t and y such that t ≤ y < γ i . Hence,
We thus conclude that β (t ) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ γ i and β (t ) = G i (t, γ i ) < 0 for all t < γ i , as claimed.
We now prove assertion (b). We know that д i (t, y) < 0 for all t and y such that t ≤ y < γ i . This implies that for t < γ i fixed, G i (t, y) is a strictly decreasing function of y on the interval [t, γ i ], so that G i (t, y) > G i (t, γ i ). Moreover, д i (t, y) ≥ 0 for all t and y such that y ≥ t and y ≥ γ i . This implies that for t < γ i fixed, G i (t, y) is a non-decreasing function of y on the interval [γ i , ∞), so that G i (t, y) ≥ G i (t, γ i ). As a consequence, β (t ) = inf s ≥t G i (t, s) = G i (t, γ i ) for all t < γ i .
Finally, in order to prove assertion (c), we note that from assertion (b), we have ϕ (t ) = G i (t, γ i k ) for all t < γ i , so that β (t ) = −д i (t, t ). Since д i (t, y) < 0 for all t and y such that t ≤ y < γ i , we have д i (t, t ) < 0 for all t < γ i , and thus β (t ) > 0 for all t < γ i .
The proof of Theorem 3.1 now readily follows from Lemma A.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. As proven in Lemma A.1, γ i is the time until which it is optimal to keep a message conditioned on the fact that the relay decides to accept it. The decision of a relay of type t can then be summarized as a choice between two options, s = 0 (reject the message) or accept and keep it until γ i . That is, π * (t; π −i ) = arg min(0, C r + G i (t, γ i ))). The best response of type t will therefore be to accept the message if and only if C r + G i (t, γ i ) < 0. Again, from Lemma A.1, β (t ) = G i (t, γ i ) is increasing in t. Thus, there exists a θ i (possible infinity) such that it is optimal to accept if t ≤ θ i and reject if t > θ i . If the message is accepted, then it is optimal to keep until γ i .
